Moral Consciousness and Moral Judgment: Cognitive, Affective and Volitional Dimensions of Ethical Agency

Author(s): Payal M Walde

Abstract:

Moral consciousness is not exhausted by the intellectual recognition that an action is right or wrong. Ethical agency ordinarily involves judgment, feeling and motivation: an agent apprehends the moral quality of conduct, responds to it through approval, disapproval, remorse or related sentiments, and experiences some practical pressure to act accordingly. This article develops that tripartite account from the traditional ethical framework reflected in J. S. Mackenzie’s moral philosophy and relates it to contemporary debates about moral judgment and motivation. It distinguishes moral judgment from logical and aesthetic judgment, examines the cognitive, affective and conative dimensions of moral consciousness, and considers Mackenzie’s “universe of desire” as a way of understanding the relation between character and particular desires. The analysis then places this framework in dialogue with sentimentalist, rationalist, internalist and externalist approaches to moral motivation. It argues that moral consciousness is best understood as an integrated structure in which cognition, emotion and volition are distinguishable but practically interdependent. Such an account explains both the action-guiding character of moral judgment and the possibility of failures in moral motivation.

keywords:
Moral consciousness; moral judgment; moral motivation; moral sentiment; ethical agency; universe of desire

Pages: 32-35     |    8 View     |    2 Download